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AbstrAct
The article aims at discussing whether State-State arbitration in foreign 
investments is an available strategy to host States. It revises the language of  
investment treaty provisions and inter-state arbitral awards and then analy-
ses cases and treaty-making practice. This article concludes that the possi-
bility of  State-State arbitration is not a backlash. It constitutes an additional 
opportunity for host States to advance their understanding of  the treaties 
and to provide balance to investment treaty commitments. While State-State 
arbitration may be a viable strategy, there are some challenges that need to 
be overcome. The definition of  the term dispute, the obligation to consult 
on the meaning of  provisions and the establishment of  a clear hierarchy 
between State-State awards in relation to investor-State awards are some of  
the ways forward.
Keywords: International Investment Law; State-State Arbitration; In-
vestment Treaties; Host States; BITs.
resumo
O artigo pretende discutir se a arbitragem Estado-Estado em matéria 
de investimentos internacionais é uma estratégia para os Estados anfitriões. 
Examina-se para tanto as provisões dos tratados de investimento e as sen-
tenças arbitrais entre Estados e analisa-se casos e práticas de elaboração 
de tratados. Este artigo conclui que a possibilidade de arbitragem Estado-
-Estado não é uma adversidade. Constitui uma oportunidade adicional para 
os Estados anfitriões avançarem a sua compreensão dos tratados e propor-
cionarem mais equilíbrio aos compromissos dos tratados de investimento. 
Enquanto a arbitragem Estado-Estado pode ser uma estratégia viável, há 
alguns desafios que precisam ser superados. A definição do termo conflito, 
a obrigação de consultar sobre o significado das disposições e o estabeleci-
mento de uma hierarquia clara entre as sentenças arbitrais Estado-Estado 
em relação às sentenças Estado-investidor são alguns dos os caminhos a 
seguir
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Estados anfitriões
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1. IntroductIon
The treatment of  foreign investments and investors 
by host States may lead to conflicts of  different natu-
re. These conflicts may give rise to claims against re-
gulations and individual decisions of  the administrative 
entities of  the government of  the host State in domes-
tic courts. The disputes may come up as claims related 
to the terms of  investment contracts and agreements, 
brought by both the host State or the investor.
It is also widely recognised that international arbi-
tration is an alternative for the resolution of  these con-
flicts, provided there is consent expressed in any ins-
trument. Bilateral investment treaties (BITs) have been 
the traditional way to provide such a consent, which is 
generally conferred by the treaty parties in relation to 
certain disputes arising under the terms of  the treaty.1 
An investor is then entitled to bring a claim against the 
host state, the so-called investor-state arbitration (ISA), 
based on BITs or, more generally, on international in-
vestment agreements, including trade agreements with 
an investment chapter (IIAs). 
It is known that most part of  the obligations in IIAs 
refer to the host States. They are responsible to gua-
rantee the standards of  treatment, with relation to fo-
reign investors and their home States. Because of  that, 
they are generally the respondents in the claims.2 On the 
other hand, the host state is not given the right to bring 
a claim against the investor based solely on the content 
of  treaty, since it was the home State of  the investor 
that signed up for the treaty obligations.
To understand this imbalance, the article analyses 
another type of  mechanism to deal with this issue. It is 
the so-called State-State3 arbitration in foreign invest-
ments (SSIA). States, as repeat players in the internatio-
nal arena, have long-term relationship concerns; thus, 
when systemic interests come into play, the State-State 
path may be more attractive. The article discusses if  it 
is an available strategy to host States under the current 
practice of  international law. The chosen methodolo-
gy is the description and analysis of  treaty provisions, 
1 For the classic argument, see Jan Paulsson, ‘Arbitration Without 
Privity’ (1995) 10 ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal 
232.
2 See generally Giorgio Sacerdoti and others (eds), General Interests 
of  Host States in International Investment Law (CUP 2014).
3 State-to-State or inter-state are also expressions related to the 
same concept.
cases decided in international arbitrations and some hy-
pothetical situations in order to conclude what are the 
available options for host States.
The theoretical and practical development of  ISA 
meant that the debate around SSIA had been gradually 
forgotten. However, both the well-known shortcomin-
gs of  ISA and the recurrent critiques against it 4 suggest 
that a fresh analysis of  the mechanism is required. Some 
State-State cases involving host States point out to a re-
surgence of  the practice in the area. These are: Peru v 
Chile5 and Ecuador v United States.6 These cases sparked 
interest and were followed by a new range of  academic 
contributors in this field.7 While these contributions 
4 See, for example, UNCTAD, ‘World Investment Report’ (United 
Nations 2015) UNCTAD/WIR/2015 120–173.
5 Peru v Chile arbitration related to the preliminary objections in 
the Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v The Republic of  
Peru, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/4
6 Republic of  Ecuador v United States of  America, PCA Case No 2012-
5, Award, 29 September 2012, Available at http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7940.pdf  
7 accessed 15 May 2017
 Chang-fa Lo, ‘Relations and Possible Interactions between State-
State Dispute Settlement and Investor-State Arbitration under Bits’ 
(2013) 6 Contemporary Asia Arbitration Journal 1; Michele Potestà, 
‘State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral Investment 
Treaties: Is There Potential?’ in Nerina Boschiero and others (eds), 
International Courts and the Development of  International Law (T M C As-
ser Press 2013); Michele Potestà, ‘Towards a Greater Role for State-
to-State Arbitration in the Architecture of  Investment Treaties?’ in 
Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo (eds), The Role of  the 
State in Investor-State Arbitration (Brill 2014); Anthea Roberts, ‘State-
to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration: A Hybrid Theory of  Inter-
dependent Rights and Shared Interpretive Authority’ (2014) 55 Har-
vard International Law Journal 1; Clovis J Trevino, ‘State-to-State 
Investment Treaty Arbitration and the Interplay with Investor–State 
Arbitration Under the Same Treaty’ (2014) 5 Journal of  Interna-
tional Dispute Settlement 199; Jarrod Wong, ‘The Subversion of  
State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (2014) 53 Columbia 
Journal of  Transnational Law 6; Nathalie Bernasconi-Osterwalder, 
‘State–State Dispute Settlement in Investment Treaties’ (Interna-
tional Institute for Sustainable Development 2014) <http://www.
iisd.org/sites/default/files/publications/best-practices-state-state-
dispute-settlement-investment-treaties.pdf> accessed 23 July 2015; 
Anthea Roberts, ‘Opinio Juris » Blog Archive HILJ Online Sympo-
sium: Anthea Roberts Responds to Martins Paparinskis - Opinio 
Juris’ <http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/31/hilj-online-symposium-
anthea-roberts-responds-martins-paparinskis/> accessed 16 May 
2016; Martins Paparinskis, ‘Opinio Juris » Blog Archive HILJ Online 
Symposium: On the Love of  Hybrids and Technicalities - Opinio 
Juris’ <http://opiniojuris.org/2014/03/31/hilj-online-symposium-
love-hybrids-technicalities/> accessed 16 May 2016; Matilde Re-
canati, ‘Diplomatic Intervention and State-to-State Arbitration as 
Alternative Means for the Protection of  Foreign Investments and 
Host States’ General Interests: The Italian Experience’ in Giorgio 
Sacerdoti and others (eds), General Interests of  Host States in Interna-
tional Investment Law (CUP 2014); Giorgio Sacerdoti and Matilde Re-
M
E
LO
, M
ur
ilo
 O
tá
vi
o 
Lu
ba
m
do
 d
e. 
H
os
t S
ta
te
s a
nd
 S
ta
te
-S
ta
te
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
rb
itr
at
io
n:
 S
tra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 C
ha
lle
ng
es
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 8
0-
93
83
recognised the importance of  SSIA, they have not yet 
analysed more carefully the strategies and challenges for 
the use of  the mechanism from the point of  view of  
the host States.
The article is structured in two parts, followed by 
a conclusion. The first part deals with concepts rela-
ted to State-State arbitration and the general ways that 
host States could use this mechanism. The second part 
analyses the strategies and new approaches and explore 
further developments in the area.
2. stAte-stAte Investment ArbItrAtIon
2.1. Jurisdictional Clauses
It is widely recognised that the introduction of  ISA 
has substituted to a large extent the recourse to diplo-
matic protection.8 This means that host States have been 
directly challenged by investors and home States have 
seen their role in arbitration progressively diminished. 
However, State-State dispute settlement mechanisms 
are still present in BITs and IIAs, though the recourse 
to this kind of  arbitration has remained rare.9
In the current practice, a typical State-State clause in 
canati, ‘Approaches to Investment Protection outside of  Specific In-
ternational Investment Agreements and Investor-State Settlement’ 
in Marc Bungenberg and others (eds), International Investment Law 
(Nomos ; Hart 2015); Theodore R Posner and Marguerite C Wal-
ter, ‘The Abiding Role of  State-State Engagement in the Resolution 
of  Investor-State Disputes’ in Jean E Kalicki and Anna Joubin-Bret 
(eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys for the 
21st Century (Brill Nijhoff  2015); María José Luque Macías, ‘Looking 
Backwards to Inter-State Investment Dispute Settlement: Is There 
Space for Transparency?’ (2016) forthcoming The Journal of  World 
Investment & Trade  - Special Issue - The Latin American Chal-
lenge to the Current System of  Investor-State Dispute Settlement; 
Murilo Lubambo, ‘Is State-State Investment Arbitration an Old Op-
tion to Latin America?’ (2016) 34(2) Conflict Resolution Quarterly 
225; David Gaukrodger, ‘State-to-State Dispute Settlement and the 
Interpretation of  Investment Treaties’ (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development 2016) OECD Working Papers on 
International Investment <http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/content/
workingpaper/5jlr71rq1j30-en> accessed 1 October 2017.
8 Ahmadou Sadio Diallo. (Republic of  Guinea v Democratic Republic of  the 
Congo) Preliminary Objections, Judgment 24 May 2007, ICJ Reports 
(2010) p. 36 para 88; CMS Gas Transmission Company (Claimant) 
and The Republic of  Argentina (Respondent) Case No. ARB/01/8 
Decision of  the Tribunal on Objections to Jurisdiction para 45
9 Rudolf  Dolzer and Christoph H Schreuer, Principles of  Interna-
tional Investment Law (2nd ed, OUP 2012) 13.
an IIA reads:
Argentina-Quatar BIT (2016)10
ARTICLE 15 - Settlement of  Disputes between 
the Contracting Parties 
1. The two Contracting Parties shall strive with 
good faith and mutual cooperation to reach a fair 
and quick settlement of  any dispute arising between 
them concerning interpretation or application of  this Treaty. 
In this connection the two Contracting Parties 
hereby agree to enter into direct objective negotiations to 
reach such settlement.
lf  the disagreement has not been settled within a 
period of  six months from the date on which the 
matter was raised by either Contracting Party, it may 
be submitted at the request of  either Contracting 
Party to an Arbitral Tribunal composed of  three 
members and under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules (2013), which shall apply except as otherwise 
mutually agreed by the disputing parties.
2. Within a period of  two months from the date 
of  receiving the said request each Contracting Party 
shall appoint one arbitrator, and the two arbitrators 
so appointed shall appoint within a period of  three 
months and with the approval of  both Contracting 
Parties the third arbitrator from a third country as 
Chairman of  the Tribunal. 
…
6. It shall not be permitted to submit a dispute to 
an Arbitral Tribunal pursuant to the provisions of  
this Article, if  the same dispute was submitted to another 
Arbitral Tribunal. 
7. The Arbitral Tribunal shall rule on the basis of  
the provisions of  this Treaty and of  the rules and 
principles of  International Law. The ruling of  the 
Tribunal shall be by majority of  votes. Such award 
shall be final and binding on both Contracting Parties. 
[emphasis added].
Therefore, in the terms of  the provision, both treaty 
parties can submit the request for arbitration when an 
issue related to the interpretation or application of  their 
treaty arises. This may arguably take place even if  there 
is a pending arbitration brought by an investor against a 
host State. It will be submitted that a SSIA dispute will 
indeed have a different nature, and thus, will not be the 
same dispute.
Some comments can be made. First of  all, if  the-
se clauses have persisted, they should not be conside-
red as dysfunctional remainders of  the old Friendship, 
10 Signed on 06 November 2016. All IIAs and model BITs and all 
the investment decisions mentioned here are available at the UNC-
TAD database and Italaw respectively <http://investmentpolicy-
hub.unctad.org/IIA > and < http://www.italaw.com > accessed 15 
May 2017
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Commerce and Navigation treaties.11 They should be 
given meaning and purpose, for their very existence; 
otherwise they “would be rendered almost completely 
ineffective (an unacceptable result as a matter of  treaty 
interpretation).”12 
Second, it could be argued that apparently there is 
a narrower scope in an SSIA clause, which generally 
refers to the interpretation and/or application of  the 
treaty, in comparison to the investor-State clause, whi-
ch generally encompasses any dispute concerning an 
investment.13 However, it should be recognised that 
the clauses have generally an all-encompassing broad 
language,14 with expression such as “any” or “a” dispu-
te, with no specific qualifications. Therefore, it is to be 
accepted that text, object and purpose and history of  
BITs reveal that State-to-State arbitration should not be 
restricted in any way.15
Finally, it is to be stressed that the involvement of  
States in the correct interpretation of  their investment 
treaties can always take place apart from State-State ar-
bitration. However, these mechanisms will not be dealt 
here.16 Also, it is recognised that home States could also 
use SSIA as an alternative litigation strategy.17 As em-
phasised elsewhere:
This is not a contention that SSIA is always a good 
substitute to ISA in terms of  effectiveness to 
enforce investors’ rights or in terms of  protection of  
the sovereign right of  host States. From a practical 
perspective, one could argue that if  a treaty includes 
11 For the historical use of  SSIA and the development of  jurisdic-
tion clauses, see Kenneth J Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties: 
History, Policy and Interpretation (OUP 2010) 24–25; 504.
12 Martins Paparinskis, ‘Investment Arbitration and the Law of  
Countermeasures’ (2009) 79 British Yearbook of  International Law 
264, 296.
13 Vandevelde (n 11) 499. See, for example, the United States BIT 
Model (2012)
14 Roberts, ‘State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 7) 
6–7; 11–12.
15 ibid 5.
16 See, in this regard, Wolfgang Alschner, ‘The Return of  the 
Home State and the Rise of  “Embedded” Investor-State Arbitra-
tion’ in Shaheeza Lalani and Rodrigo Polanco Lazo (eds), The Role 
of  the State in Investor-State Arbitration (Brill 2014) 309–324; Tomoko 
Ishikawa, ‘Keeping Interpretation In Investment Treaty Arbitration 
“on Track”: The Role of  State Parties’ in Jean E Kalicki and Anna 
Joubin-Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: 
Journeys for the 21st Century (Brill Nijhoff  2015).
17 That was the issue in Italy v Cuba, Italian Republic v Republic of  
Cuba, ad hoc State-State arbitration, Award 1 Jan 2008. Because it in-
volved a claim by the home State in its use of  diplomatic protection, 
this case is not analysed further. For details, see Michele Potestà, 
‘Republic of  Italy v. Republic of  Cuba’ (2012) 106 AJIL 341.
only the option of  SSIA, the politically connected 
or economically robust companies would probably 
be the only ones able to convince the States to 
endorse their claims. The greater risk is for small 
and medium enterprises, which are less connected. 
Since they are the ones that should be benefiting 
from the investor-state system, a change to SSIA 
would not be more efficient for them.18
Nevertheless, the focus of  this article is on how host 
States could effectively resort to SSIA as a defensive 
strategy and on what challenges they would face.
2.2. Host States: SSIA as a “Shield”
2.2.1. State-State and Interpretative Claims
It is time now to explore the possibility that host 
States resort to interpretive claims in the form of  de-
claratory decisions. State-State arbitration under the ju-
risdictional clause in an IIA seems to be an adequate 
avenue for that. One could suggest that the request for 
a declaratory decision would be within the mandate of  
most SSIA jurisdiction clauses since this would involve 
elements of  interpretation or application of  the treaty. 
If  an SSIA claim is brought by the host State, it will be a 
dispute between the host and home State related to the 
interpretation of  a treaty provision and not a decision 
on whether the specific investor suffered a breach and 
should be entitled compensation.
International courts can be called upon to resolve 
merely interpretive questions, without claims of  treaty 
violations and can recognise jurisdiction to make de-
claratory awards on the right interpretation of  a provi-
sion.19 One might recall “the fundamental purpose of  a 
declaratory judgment which is designed, in contentious 
proceedings involving a genuine dispute, to clarify and 
stabilize the legal relations of  the parties”,20 which would 
be the practical result of  the issue.  Thus, declaratory 
claims seem to be admissible for host States, so that 
18 Lubambo (n 7) 229.
19 See Expert Opinion of  Prof. Alain Pellet, Memorial, n 6 p. 15-
18, para 26-36 Citing among others ICJ Judgement , 27 August 1952, 
Rights of  the National of  the United States of  American in Morocco (France v 
United States of  America), ICJ Reports 1952, p. 179 and ICJ Judgement 
13 July 2009, Dispute Regarding Navigational and Related Rights 
(Costa Rica v Nicaragua), ICJ Report 2009, p. 270-271 par. 156.
20 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France), Joint Dissenting Opinion of  
Judges Oneyama, Dillard, Jiménez de Aréchaga and Sir Humphrey 
Waldock, 20 December 1974, ICJ, ICJ Reports 1974, 321 (para 21).
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tribunals could be asked to adjudicate on interpretative 
issues.21
But why would host States be interested in doing 
so? It is suggested that this could ensure that specific 
provisions are not given an interpretation that is di-
vergent with the parties’ intentions. This is especially 
relevant in face of  the controversial interpretations by 
investor-State tribunals. Depending on how the consent 
to SSIA is framed and on whether there is a “dispute” 
with the other treaty party (the home State), this ave-
nue may be promising. This is what one can draw from 
the Ecuador-United States litigation in the Permanent 
Court of  Arbitration, to be commented later. 
Of  course, interpretive claims can also be used by 
home States. To illustrate, the conflict that resulted in 
the arbitration between BCB v Belize22 could have in-
volved a State-State arbitration pursuant to the United 
Kingdom (UK)-Belize BIT. The mechanism was an ex-
tra tool to make the investor State arbitration effective, 
with a declaratory decision on the meaning of  a BIT 
provision.23 In the specific case, an interpretative claim 
was cogitated by the UK to check the interpretation of  
a specific BIT provision. Both Belize and the UK would 
have had already expressed their views, so the existence 
of  a “dispute” would not be a problem. 24 Anyway, a 
broad definition by the parties in their treaties of  the 
term “dispute” would be the natural solution to enlarge 
the role of  SSIA25, especially for host States.
21 See Gaukrodger (n 7) 28–31. which brings the example of  Kyr-
gyzstan’s request for the interpretation of  the Moscow Convention, 
in the context several ISA claims against that host State.
22 British Caribbean Bank Limited v. The Government of  Belize, 
UNCITRAL, Award (19 December 2014), PCA Case No. 2010-18, 
23 Posner and Walter (n 7) 387–388. See also Luke Eric Peterson, 
“Spectre of  State-to-State claim recedes as Belize makes peace with 
investor-State proceeding (and some transparency)” Sep 30, 2013 | 
by  <http://www.iareporter.com/articles/spectre-of-state-to-state-
claim-recedes-as-belize-makes-peace-with-investor-state-proceed-
ing-and-some-transparency/ > accessed 1 October 2017
24 Peterson ibid “… [i]t might have fallen to the United Kingdom 
to determine whether it took a different view as to the interpretation to be 
given to the investor-state arbitration mechanism of  the UK-Belize 
BIT. If  the UK wished to push such an alternative interpretation, 
it would have enjoyed the ability to initiate a state-to-state arbitra-
tion with Belize, pursuant to Article 9 of  the BIT, in order to seek 
a determination of  a dispute over the ‘interpretation or application’ 
of  the BIT…. [t]he UK-Belize controversy might have presented a 
more clear-cut dispute given that both sides would have presumably weighed in 
with differing views as to whether the investor-state provisions of  the 
treaty are subject to a ripeness or even an exhaustion requirement.” 
emphasis added
25 Bernasconi-Osterwalder (n 7) 21.
2.2.2. Relation between SSIA and ISA
These types of  claims bring the issue of  the rela-
tion between State-State arbitration and investor-State, 
especially the possible binding effect of  the former on 
the latter. It is important to recall that international law 
does not exclude conflict of  rules nor does it prohi-
bit States from undertaking conflicting obligations, but 
courts have applied techniques of  general international 
law to dismiss conflict.26 The answer would naturally 
depend on several aspects, such as whether the SSIA 
takes place after, parallely or before an ISA proceeding 
and obviously on the subject matter of  the proceedings. 
In this regard, the academic literature varies. One 
might argue that there is binding effect with regard to 
the interpretation of  treaty provisions from SSIA in re-
lation to future investor-State tribunals.27 Another con-
tention would be to accept this last conclusion, unless 
the “interstate interpretation is manifestly incompatible 
or irreconcilable with the treaty text and/or the trea-
ty parties’ intended meaning”.28 Some suggest that the 
effects of  res judicata would be a better approach to the 
matter.29 Others propose relying on the good faith prin-
ciple to solve conflicts between parallel or successive ar-
bitration proceedings, especially for the last tribunal to 
be called upon;30 this seems to suggest the “priority of  
the court first seised” or an adoption of  “the principle 
of  priority in time”.31 
Finally, one takes note of  the controversial claim 
that SSIA should be always precluded whenever there 
is an investment treaty containing an investor-State clause 
with jurisdiction to deal with the issue, regardless of  
whether consent to it has been perfected.32 This would 
26 James Crawford and Penelope Nevill, ‘Relations between In-
ternational Courts and Tribunals: The “Regime Problem”’, Regime 
Interaction in International Law (CUP 2012) 236–237.
27 Potestà, ‘Towards a Greater Role for State-to-State Arbitra-
tion in the Architecture of  Investment Treaties?’ (n 7) 270–272. Cf. 
Potestà, ‘State-to-State Dispute Settlement Pursuant to Bilateral In-
vestment Treaties’ (n 7) 762. See also Broches opinion in ICSID, 
Convention on the Settlement of  Investment Disputes between States and Na-
tionals of  Other States (International Centre for Settlement of  Invest-
ment Disputes 1968) 350. “[T]he Tribunal constituted under the 
Convention would regard itself  as bound by the decision under the bilateral 
agreement, to the extent that the interpretation of  that agreement had 
a bearing on the case before it.”
28 Trevino (n 7) 232.
29 Paparinskis (n 7).
30 Lo (n 7) 15–21. 
31 Crawford and Nevill (n 26) 244.
32 Wong (n 7) 31–37.
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go against the principle of  effectiveness of  the juris-
diction clause. In this regard, Berman comments that 
“the idea of  there being a parallel State-to-State forum 
for sorting out problems, which as foreseen from the 
outset alongside the investor-to-State system is some-
thing which is available, should be available, might be more 
available in the future…”33 Thus, one should conclude that 
SSIA is not merely subsidiary to ISA. 
This contribution does not aim to give defini-
te answers. But, considering an express delegation of  
interpretive powers by the parties to the State-State 
tribunals,34 few would deny that a previous State-State 
arbitration decision, which interprets a specific provi-
sion in a treaty, should be, at least, highly persuasive to 
future investor-State tribunals dealing with the same 
subject matter. This is because it would be very diffi-
cult to ignore the interpretation made by a tribunal, the 
adjudicatory authority of  which is based exactly on a 
jurisdictional clause to interpret the treaty.  This enhances 
the value of  a State-State arbitration ignited by the host 
State, as an effective litigation strategy.
2.2.3. Declaratory Claims of Non-Breach
Another option one could think for the host State 
is to resort to declaratory claims of  non-breach or of  
limited breach. This means seeking a declaration that a 
host State measure is fully or partially consistent with its 
obligations under a treaty. In this regard, Roberts pon-
ders whether a host State could ask for a declaration of  
non-violation of  the treaty and, by pre-emption, avoid 
investor-State claims or force them to be solved on a 
class-wide basis. 35 Imagine that a state desires to edit 
a new law establishing an obligation for companies to 
keep a substantially larger area of  native forests along 
the river margins and the coastal areas. They may desire 
to make sure that this will not be considered indirect 
expropriation of  foreign investment developments in 
33 Berman (n 19) 72 emphasis added.”page”:”67-72; 
82”,”source”:”catalogue.ulrls.lon.ac.uk Library Catalog”,”event-
p l ace” :”London” ,” ISBN”:”978-1 -905221-08-0” ,”ca l l -
number”:”TCD PL-471-275”,”collection-editor”:[{“family”:”Ort
ino”,”given”:”Federico”}],”editor”:[{“literal”:”British Institute of  
International and Comparative Law”}],”author”:[{“family”:”Berma
n”,”given”:”Frank”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2007”]]}},”locator”
:”72”,”suffix”:”added emphasis”}],”schema”:”https://github.com/
citation-style-language/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”} 
34 Anthea Roberts, ‘Power and Persuasion in Investment Treaty 
Interpretation: The Dual Role of  States’ (2010) 104 AJIL 179, 225.
35 Roberts, ‘State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 7) 10.
those areas, which would be in breach of  an IIA clause.
Due to the lack of  case law regarding this type of  
claims, some have expressed concerns especially ques-
tioning the scope of  the SSIA provision.36 But there 
seems to be some room to the contention that the host 
State is entitled to make such a request for a declaratory 
award of  non-breach. Some arguments are presented, 
without intending to close the issue.
First of  all, this would be indeed an application of  
treaty provisions to a set of  facts, therefore, generally 
included in the jurisdiction of  State-State tribunals. The 
request is for the tribunal to analyse whether or not 
facts or conducts fall under treaty rules. Of  course, the 
host State will run the risk of  receiving a non-wanted 
response.
Second, a declaratory judgment is not always to be 
considered a form of  satisfaction, therefore, requiring 
an international wrongful act.37 Its nature is more linked 
to the judicial act itself, in order to solve a wide variety 
of  disputes.38 In several cases, the World Court had to 
declare rights without referring to a breach or violation, 
thus, not ruling on issues of  responsibility. 39 
Third, both host and home States would be bound 
by the non-breach decision rendered by a SSIA tribunal. 
At least, the home State would be under an obligation 
of  good faith not to frustrate the declaratory decision. 
This possibly makes it incapable of  offering diplomatic 
protection based on the measure or prohibited to acti-
vely encourage its nationals to seek international treaty-
-based arbitration.
Finally, the request for a declaration of  non-brea-
ch, with its resulting consequences, is what respondent 
States would seek by using counterclaims. Judicial eco-
nomy and guarantee of  consistency are among the ratio-
nale for recognising counterclaims.40 Provided that some 
criteria are fulfilled (jurisdiction of  the court and direct 
36 Bernasconi-Osterwalder (n 7) 14.
37 Eric Wyler and Alan Papaux, ‘The Different Forms of  Repa-
ration: Satisfaction’ in James Crawford, Alain Pellet and Simon 
Olleson (eds), The law of  international responsibility (OUP 2010).
38 Juliette McIntyre, ‘Declaratory Judgments of  the International 
Court of  Justice’, Hague Yearbook of  International Law (Martinus Ni-
jhoff  2012) 156.
39 Right of  Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India), 12 April 
1960, ICJ, Merits, ICJ Reports 1960; Dispute regarding Navigational and 
Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), 13 July 2009, ICJ, Judgment, 
ICJ Reports 2009, 269-272, para 156.
40 Constantine Antonopoulos, Counterclaims before the International 
Court of  Justice (TMC Asser Press 2011) 57–59.
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connection to the subject of  the main claim),41 courts 
have been entertaining counterclaims.42 Thus, why not 
accept them as claims at the beginning? It is true that a 
counterclaim is not a defence on the merit, but requires 
something “more” in the form of  a judgement against 
the applicant, but it is an alternative to deprive a main 
claim of  force and mitigate its adverse character.43
Anyway, it is in the binding effect of  the declaration 
on future investor-State tribunals where the problem 
lies. While it is difficult to accept that it would pre-empt 
future tribunals, it is submitted that the decision should 
certainly be highly persuasive on them.
3. new strAtegIes And ApproAches
3.1. Strategies for Host States
There are State-State provisions in virtually all of  
BITs and other agreements with investment provi-
sions.44 As seen above, these clauses are more than pre-
sent and need to be given meaning and purpose. This 
is not a contention that SSIA is a good substitute to a 
competent defence in an ISA in terms of  effectiveness 
to the protection of  the sovereign right of  host States. 
SSIA can be useful to the host State on its own or as 
complement to ISA.
As an example, the first attempt of  coordination 
between ISA and SSIA proceedings took place in Em-
presa Luchetti v Peru referred to Peru v Chile.45 It was, for 
some time, the only State-State dispute under a BIT. 
The underlying rationale of  the case seemed to accept 
the principle of  an exclusive mandate for each consti-
tuted tribunal, where no coordination at all is attemp-
ted. 46 The investor’s tribunal denied the request for 
suspension made by the host State (Peru), which had 
submitted an arbitration against the home State (Chile) 
regarding the interpretation of  the BIT; but, in the end, 
the investor’s tribunal dismissed the claim for lack of  
41 According to Rule 80(1) of  the ICJ Rules of  the Court.
42 Antonopoulos (n 40) 73–134.
43 ibid 60; 63.
44 See < http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/IIA > accessed 
15 May 2017
45 See n 5
46 Crawford and Nevill (n 26) 237–239.
jurisdiction.47 An opposite approach would be the op-
tion for coordination, which would be the result of  the 
application of  the general principle of  cooperation, by 
showing jurisdictional deference to the SSIA, which did 
not happen.48
To illustrate the strategies for host States, one could 
reflect on the outcome of  litigations such as those rela-
ted to Argentinian crisis. Several of  those cases affected 
US investors and suffered from a lack of  consistency.49 
The question is how it would be different in the case 
of  the existence of  a binding interpretation made by an 
SSIA tribunal, previous to the ISA tribunals. The inter-
pretation could relate to controversial BIT provisions 
or to the interplay between customary international and 
treaty law, for example.
In the context of  the Argentina-US BIT, it is worth 
exploring how both home and host States could have 
used the State-State arbitration. The relevant clauses are 
the following:
ARTICLE VI 
The Parties agree to consult promptly, on the request 
of  either, to resolve any disputes in connection with 
the Treaty, or to discuss any matter relating to the 
interpretation or application of  the Treaty. 
...
ARTICLE VIII 
1. Any dispute between the Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of  the Treaty which 
is not resolved through consultations or other 
diplomatic channels, shall be submitted, upon the 
request of  either Party, to an arbitral tribunal for 
binding decision in accordance with the applicable 
rules of  international law. In the absence of  an 
agreement by the Parties to the contrary, the 
arbitration rules of  the United Nations Commission 
on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), except 
to the extent modified by the Parties or by the 
arbitrators, shall govern. 
...
47 See Empresas Luchetti n 5 362: “Respondent filed a request for 
suspension of  the proceedings, in view of  the fact that ‘Claimants’ 
Request for Arbitration [was] (...) the subject of  a concurrent State-
to-State dispute between the Republic of  Peru and the Republic of  
Chile.’ ... [T]he Tribunal found that the conditions for a suspension 
of  the proceedings were not met and confirmed the schedule for the 
submission of  pleadings on the objections to jurisdiction.”
48 Crawford and Nevill (n 26) 242–243.
49 For an analysis on the lack of  consistency and its consequences 
on legitimacy, see William W Burke-White, ‘Argentine Financial Cri-
sis: State Liability under BITs and the Legitimacy of  the ICSID Sys-
tem, The’ (2008) 3 Asian Journal of  WTO and International Health 
Law and Policy 199.
M
E
LO
, M
ur
ilo
 O
tá
vi
o 
Lu
ba
m
do
 d
e. 
H
os
t S
ta
te
s a
nd
 S
ta
te
-S
ta
te
 In
ve
st
m
en
t A
rb
itr
at
io
n:
 S
tra
te
gi
es
 a
nd
 C
ha
lle
ng
es
. R
ev
ist
a 
de
 D
ire
ito
 In
te
rn
ac
io
na
l, 
Br
as
íli
a, 
v. 
14
, n
. 2
, 2
01
7 
p.
 8
0-
93
88
It seems legally possible that Argentina, as a host 
State, could have initiated an interpretative claim against 
the United States to provide legal certainty to its defen-
ce. The objective would be to obtain a clearer interpre-
tation of  a contentious provision, most probably to its 
own benefit. This would have ensured more consistent 
results in the investor-State claims. There seems to be 
compelling arguments to sustain this position.  
In this regard, the Ecuador v US case50 is illustrative. 
Ecuador brought a claim against the United States for 
the interpretation of  Article II(7) of  the US-Ecuador 
BIT, which dealt the ‘effective means’ obligation. The 
same provision was one the contested issues of  a pen-
ding investor-State arbitration brought by an American 
investor against Ecuador. The United States had not 
responded to Ecuador’s initiative to discuss the content 
of  the provision. It seems that the silence of  the Uni-
ted States with the regard to Ecuador`s request for in-
terpretation of  the article and the communication that 
it would not manifest at all on the matter51 could be 
interpreted as inaction. This would amount to holding 
“opposing views”, thereby creating a dispute.52 
However, the majority of  the tribunal was not fully 
convinced and denied jurisdiction for the inexistence of  
a dispute. Claiming that the recourse to SSIA was void of  
practical consequences and could jeopardise the effecti-
veness of  ISA, the majority argued that:
… the United States could directly allege a breach 
of  the ‘effective means’ obligation in Article II(7) 
against Ecuador, in which case there would be clear 
‘practical consequences’ for both Parties. … [S]
ome commentators consider that recourse to State-
to-State dispute resolution for breaches of  a BIT 
may be possible, in particular where the investment 
dispute in question has not already been submitted 
to investor-State arbitration under Article VI. The 
Tribunal makes no finding on this point, but is not 
persuaded to exclude this possibility outright.
 One interpretation was that the award was a cons-
cious application of  a technique described as a restric-
tive interpretation of  a ‘dispute’ for the purposes of  a 
50 See n 6
51 See n 6 Witness Statement of  Mr. Luis Benigno Gallegos
52 See n 6 Expert Opinion Pellet, McCaffrey and Amerasinghe 
generally citing Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and 
Nigeria (Cameroon v Nigeria), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 1998, p. 315, para 89 and Application of  the Convention on 
the Elimination of  All forms of  Racial Discrimination (Georgia v Russia), 
Preliminary Objections, ICJ Judgement, 1 Paril 2011, ICJ Reports 
2011, p. 16, para 30
treaty.53 Therefore, a broader definition of  dispute in 
the SSIA context within the treaty could be useful, as 
suggested above. Note, though, that the majority did 
not exclude the possibility of  recourse to SSIA for BIT 
breaches. The dissenter considered that silence repre-
sents a dispute in the following terms:
The myth of  judicializing diplomacy in resorting to 
arbitration in order to settle a dispute underestimates 
the dispute settlement system which, in this case, 
is activated by the reluctance of  one of  the Parties to 
acknowledge a dispute and the frustration of  prospective 
negotiations as the primary method to reach an agreement 
acceptable to both Parties. Therefore, the interpretation 
made by an arbitral tribunal constituted under 
Article VII will neither jeopardise nor undermine 
the arbitration mechanism between investors and 
States set forth in Article VI. On the other hand, it 
is difficult to understand how recourse to arbitration 
will politicise investment disputes between investors 
and States, where the purpose of  arbitration is to interpret 
a treaty rule according to what the parties regarded is its content 
and scope, thus ensuring the necessary credibility of  the system 
by clarifying the law in force, as the Parties stated at the 
time of  expressing their consent to be bound.54
Since the decision has been extensively discussed and 
commented elsewhere,55 the focus is on one argument 
raised by Ecuador, which deserves attention. Conside-
ring that most IIAs have provisions on the obligation to 
consult (art. VI in the US-Argentina BIT), the refusal to 
do so is a breach of  the treaty. It is submitted that an 
interpretation of  the tribunal of  the provision that was 
the aim of  the consultations can be considered proper 
satisfaction, a form of  reparation under international 
law, appropriate to put an end to the violation.56 This 
path can be explored, provided that the parties show 
evidence that the claimant made every effort to consult. 
A clearer language in this line can be noticed in arti-
cle 15.1 of  the recent Argentina-Qatar BIT reproduced 
above: parties are obliged to engage in good faith direct 
negotiations regarding the interpretation of  provisions 
of  the treaty.
53 Crawford and Nevill (n 26) 241.
54 Republic of  Ecuador v United States of  America, PCA Case No 
2012-5, Dissenting Opinion of  Prof. Raúl Emilio Vinuesa, 29 Sep-
tember 2012 Available at < http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/
files/case-documents/italaw7942_0.pdf  > accessed 15 May 2017
55 See, for example, Marcin Orecki, ‘State-to-State Arbitration 
pursuant to Bilateral Investment Treaties: The Ecuador–US Dis-
pute.’ <http://www.youngicca-blog.com/state-to-state-arbitration-
pursuant-to-bilateral-investment-treaties-the-ecuador-us-dispute/> 
accessed 16 May 2015; Bernasconi-Osterwalder (n 7) 11–14; Rob-
erts, ‘State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 7) 10–16.
56 Pellet, Expert Report (n 19) 18
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Thus, it is convincing to think that Argentina could 
have initiated consultations with the United States to 
provide a binding interpretation of  treaty provisions. 
In case of  disagreement, it could bring a State-State 
interpretive claim.57 Anyway, it has been reported that 
the country at least envisaged such possibility to bring 
clarity and coherence to divergent interpretation of  its 
cases.58 As sustained elsewhere:
In fact, the criteria for using the state-state 
jurisdictional clause as a defense are not clear. This may 
explain why it has not been used more extensively. 
The unsuccessful attempts appear to be due more to 
the specificities of  the cases than to an impossibility of  
using the clause that way.59
Moreover, there are reasonable arguments for ano-
ther possibility. Argentina, as a host State, could have 
brought a declaratory claim that it was not liable, clai-
ming there had been no treaty violations. For example, 
Argentina could have requested a State-State arbitration 
asking for the court for a declaration that the measures 
taken after the Argentinian crisis were taken in accor-
dance with art. XI of  the BIT with the United States; 
therefore, they were necessary to protect its essential 
security interests.  On the other hand, one might doubt 
that Argentina could have prevented all the investor-
-State claims with this initiative.
Finally, as to the enforcement pressure against Argen-
tina due to the non-payment of  its awards, measures cha-
racterised as retorsion were carried out, but none reached 
a State-State phase.60 In the aftermath of  the discussion, 
Argentina`s position was in favour of  the use of  State-
-State arbitration. In the ICSID context, this means using 
57 Cf  Roberts, ‘State-to-State Investment Treaty Arbitration’ (n 
7) 4.
58 “Argentine Republic officials have deliberated for some time as 
to whether to seek state-to-state arbitration … it would seem unlike-
ly that the Republic would be dissuaded from pursuing state-to-state 
arbitration merely on the basis of  the failure of  Ecuador’s efforts. 
….” As reported inn Luke Eric Peterson, ‘United States defeats 
Ecuador’s state-to-state arbitration; will outcome dissuade Argen-
tine copycat case?’ (IAReporter, 2 September 2012) <http://www.
iareporter.com/articles/united-States-defeats-ecuadors-state-to-
state-arbitration-will-outcome-dissuade-argentine-copycat-case/ > 
accessed 15 May 2017. 
59 Lubambo (n 7) 239.
60 Brooks E Allen and Tommaso Soave, ‘Jurisdictional Overlap 
in WTO Dispute Settlement and Investment Arbitration’ in Jorge 
A Huerta-Goldman, Antoine Romanetti and Franz X Stirnimann 
(eds), WTO Litigation, Investment Arbitration and Commercial Arbitration 
(Kluwer Law International 2013) 379–381; Catharine Titi, ‘Invest-
ment Arbitration in Latin America’ (2014) 30 Arbitration Interna-
tional 357, 369–377.
art. 64 of  the Convention, which fulfils the consent to 
grant jurisdiction to the International Court of  Justice – 
ICJ. The result would be a decision of  the ICJ, ruling 
that the State has or has not violated its obligations under 
art. 53 of  the ICSID Convention. Argentina recalled art. 
64, indicating that the ICJ was the appropriate forum to 
discuss non-enforcement of  awards.61 Nevertheless, to 
date, though, this option has not been used.62 As another 
example, it could be mentioned that in a demand related 
to its sovereign debts, Argentina tried to sue the US in the 
ICJ claiming violations of  its sovereignty and immunities 
in relation to decisions of  US Courts. The US refused to 
accept jurisdiction.63
3.2. New Approaches for Host States
Coming to the end of  the article, it is worth com-
menting on new treaty-making approaches. It is impor-
tant to emphasise that a reaction against ISA or a tra-
ditional stance against it does not mean disengagement 
with international investment law. As an illustrative 
point, South American States have reached an advanced 
level of  the negotiations towards the constitution of  a 
centre for the settlement of  disputes, a process initiated 
in 2008, under the umbrella of  UNASUR.64 UNASUR 
regional initiative came in line with withdrawals from 
ICSID and as a political reaction against the outcomes 
of  the system.65 This may bring a new arena to decide 
on or settle disputes involving investors or States of  the 
region and outside it. In this regard, one might notice 
the likelihood of  the inclusion of  SSIA in the UNA-
SUR Centre.66 However, the potential of  the UNASUR 
Centre will only be real if  it is given jurisdiction progres-
sively, 67 by means of  consent in investment agreements 
61 Posner and Walter (n 7) 388; Titi (n 60) 374.
62 Allen and Soave (n 60) 380.
63 See <http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/4/18354.pdf  >
64 For details about the BIT practice of  South American coun-
tries, see Magdalena Bas, ‘América do Sul em face dos tratados bi-
laterais de investimento: rumo ao retorno do Estado na solução de 
controvérsias?’ (2016) 13 Revista de Direito Internacional (Brazilian 
Journal of  International Law) <https://www.publicacoesacademi-
cas.uniceub.br/rdi/article/view/3944> accessed 1 October 2017.
65 Omar E García-Bolívar, ‘Permanent Investment Tribunals: 
The Momentum Is Building Up’ in Jean E Kalicki and Anna Joubin-
Bret (eds), Reshaping the Investor-State Dispute Settlement System: Journeys 
for the 21st Century (Brill Nijhoff  2015) 396; 399.
66 Available at < http://www.andes.info.ec/es/noticias/exper-
tos-unasur-ultiman-detalles-creacion-tribunal-o-comision-solucion-
controversias.html > accessed 15 May 2017.
67 García-Bolívar (n 65) 402.
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or contracts, for subsequent disputes.
The dispute settlement mechanism of  the new in-
vestment treaty model of  Brazil merits discussion. 
The model resulted in treaties signed with Angola, 
Mozambique and Malawi in Africa and Mexico, Chile, 
Colombia and Peru in Latin America.68 Most recently, 
MERCOSUR members signed an intra-bloc treaty, the 
Protocol of  Cooperation and Facilitation of  Invest-
ments.69 The new treaties have constituted a political 
compromise that seek to maintain coherence with the 
traditional policy discourse in Brazil against ISA.70 The 
treaties have been the focus of  some academic analy-
sis, especially in relation to its standards and novelties.71 
However, what interests most here are the mechanisms 
for dispute settlement.
Unlike the treaties signed with the African States, 
which refer only to the possibility of  future develop-
ment of  SSIA, the treaties signed by Brazil with the 
Latin American States contain consent by the parties 
to SSIA. In this regard, the provisions of  the Brazil-
-Mexico BIT are the following:
Artículo 19
Solución de Controversias entre las Partes
1. Cualquiera de las Partes podrá recurrir al arbitraje 
entre los Estados, una vez que se haya agotado el 
procedimiento previsto en el párrafo 3 del Artículo 
18 sin que la disputa haya sido resuelta.
2. El objetivo del arbitraje es poner en conformidad con 
el presente Acuerdo la medida eventualmente declarada como 
disconforme al mismo por el laudo arbitral. Las Partes, 
sin embargo, podrán acordar que los árbitros 
examinen la existencia de perjuicios causados por 
la medida cuestionada y establezcan por medio del 
68 See <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/index.php?option=com_
content&view=article&id=9890:acordo-brasil-mexico-de-coop-
eracao-e-facilitacao-de-investimentos-cidade-do-mexico-26-de-
maio-de-2015&catid=42&Itemid=280&lang=pt-BR > accessed 15 
May 2017.
69 See <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/pt-BR/notas-a-
imprensa/16067-protocolo-de-cooperacao-e-facilitacao-de-investi-
mentos-do-mercosul-pcfi  > accessed 15 May 2017.
70 For a general description of  the Brazilian policy, see Daniel de 
Andrade Levy, Ana Gerdau de Borja and Adriana Pucci (eds), Invest-
ment Protection in Brazil (Kluwer Law International 2014). 
71 Nitish Monebhurrun, ‘Novelty in International Investment 
Law: The Brazilian Agreement on Cooperation and Facilitation of  
Investments as a Different International Investment Agreement 
Model’ [2016] Journal of  International Dispute Settlement; Ca-
tharine Titi, ‘International Investment Law and the Protection of  
Foreign Investment in Brazil’ Transnational Dispute Management 
<http://www.transnational-dispute-management.com/journal-ad-
vance-publication-article.asp?key=592> accessed 15 May 2015.
laudo, una indemnización por dichos perjuicios. 
Si el laudo arbitral establece una compensación 
monetaria, la Parte que recibe tal indemnización 
deberá transferirla a los titulares de los derechos 
de la inversión en cuestión, una vez deducidos los 
costos de la controversia, de conformidad con los 
procedimientos internos de cada Parte.
3. Este Artículo no se aplicará a ninguna controversia 
que haya surgido ni a ninguna medida que haya sido 
adoptada antes de la fecha de entrada en vigor del 
presente Acuerdo. 
4. Las Partes podrán constituir un tribunal arbitral 
específico para la controversia de conformidad con 
el párrafo 5 de este Artículo, u optar, conjuntamente, 
por someter la controversia a otro mecanismo para 
solución de controversias entre Estados en materia 
de inversiones.
...
8. El tribunal arbitral determinará su propio 
procedimiento y tomará su decisión por mayoría de 
votos. Tal decisión será obligatoria para ambas Partes. 
A menos que se acuerde de otra manera, la decisión 
del tribunal arbitral deberá dictarse dentro de los seis 
(6) meses siguientes a la designación del Presidente, de 
conformidad con los párrafos 4 y 5 de este Artículo.
In the same line, it is worth transcribing below some 
parts of  the respective provision in the Investment 
Chapter of  the Brazil-Peru Economic and Trade Ex-
pansion Agreement, signed in April 2016:
Artigo 2.21: Solução de Controvérsias entre as 
Partes 
1. Qualquer uma das Partes poderá recorrer a 
mecanismos de arbitragem entre os Estados, desde 
que tenha esgotado o procedimento previsto no 
artigo 2.20.3 (Consultas e Negociações Diretas) 
sem que a controvérsia tenha sido resolvida. 
2. O objetivo da arbitragem entre os Estados é 
colocar em conformidade com o Capítulo a medida 
declarada incompatível com o Capítulo pelo laudo arbitral. 
3. Não poderão ser objeto de arbitragem os artigos 
2.12 (Investimento e Medidas sobre Saúde, Meio 
Ambiente e outros Objetivos Regulatórios em 
Matéria Social); 2.13 (Responsabilidade Social 
Corporativa); e 2.14 (Medidas sobre Investimento e 
Luta contra a Corrupção e a Ilegalidade). 
4. Nenhuma reclamação poderá ser submetida 
ao mecanismo previsto neste Artigo, se tiver 
transcorrido um prazo maior que cinco anos 
contados a partir da data em que o investidor teve 
pela primeira vez ou deveria ter tido conhecimento 
pela primeira vez de uma alegada violação deste 
Acordo. 
5. O Tribunal Arbitral será constituído em 
conformidade com o parágrafo 6 deste artigo. Não 
obstante, as Partes poderão decidir conjuntamente 
submeter a controvérsia a uma instituição arbitral 
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permanente para a solução de controvérsias entre 
Estados relativas a investimentos. 
...
10. O tribunal arbitral determinará seu próprio 
procedimento. O tribunal arbitral tomará sua 
decisão por maioria de votos. Tal decisão será 
obrigatória para ambas as Partes. A menos que as 
Partes decidam algo distinto, o laudo do tribunal 
arbitral deverá ser prolatado dentro dos seis meses 
seguintes à designação do Presidente de acordo 
com os parágrafos (6) e (7). 
First of  all, it is to be noted that the dispute settlement 
provisions of  the treaties focus primarily on dispute pre-
vention (Brazil-Mexico BIT, art. 18 and Brazil-Peru Chap-
ter, art. 2.20).72 This was highlighted in the context of  revi-
sion of  treaty-making practice as an alternative model.73 A 
traditional system of  consultations between the parties is 
available with regard to the interpretation and application 
of  the treaty in relation to specific measure affecting an 
investor. The difference is that the investor will take part 
in the proceedings, providing information and attending 
the consultation meetings. A final opinion on the dispute 
by each of  the parties is to be issued at the end of  the 
consultation proceedings.
Secondly, the result of  the consultations will base the 
SSIA claim, which can take the form of  declaratory claims 
in relation to the compatibility of  a general or more con-
crete measure affecting an investor (Brazil-Mexico BIT, 
art. 19(2) and Brazil-Peru, art. 2.21(2)).74 In this regard, 
the available remedy within the mandate of  the tribunal 
will be the declaration of  the conformity of  the measure 
with the treaty. But this is not equivalent to an order for 
withdrawal or change of  the measure. On the other hand, 
it is not clear whether questions of  mere interpretation 
of  the treaties will be under the jurisdiction of  the SSIA 
clause, absent a concrete affected investor. However, one 
can presume that they are included, based on the reading 
of  some provisions (Brazil-Mexico BIT, art. 14(4)f  and 
Brazil-Peru Chapter, art. 2.15(4)g )75, provided that the 
respective Joint Committees have previously addressed 
the matter or agreed on the request.
Finally, there are effective mechanisms to ensure 
72 See also Art. 22 of  the Brazil-Colombia IIA and Art. 24 of  the 
Brazil-Chile IIA.
73 UNCTAD (n 4) 108; 152.
74 See also Art. 23[2[ of  the Brazil-Colombia IIA and Annex 1, 
Art. 3 of  the Brazil-Chile IIA.
75 See also Art. 16[4]f  of  Brazil-Colombia IIA and Art. 1[1] of  
the Annex of  the Brasil-Chile IIA.
that the constitution of  the State-State tribunal is not 
impaired by inaction of  the parties.76 The decision will 
be mandatory to the parties (Brazil-Mexico BIT, Art. 
19.8 and Brazil-Peru Chapter, art. 2.21(10)).77 Moreo-
ver, the treaties most probably refer to the UNASUR 
Centre of  Dispute Settlement, if  it allows for SSIA in 
the future, which would replace some provisions on the 
constitution of  arbitral tribunals ((Brazil-Mexico BIT 
Art. 19.4 and Brazil-Peru Chapter, art. 2.21(5)).78
To conclude, the SSIA provisions in the Brazilian 
treaties with Latin American States provide for the pos-
sibility of  declaratory awards in relation to a measure, 
by request of  both home and host States. The treaties 
could have been clearer on the conferral of  jurisdiction 
to State-State arbitration in relation to the interpretation 
and application of  general provisions. When it comes 
to the possibility of  a declaration of  non-breach, this 
would be of  less use here, given the absence of  sub-
sequent investor-state arbitration. There is some room 
for the consultations and negotiations and the SSIA is 
available to solve all pending issues, but the recourse 
to it is currently unrealistic. While host States are safe 
against the risks of  investor-state arbitration, the lack of  
ISA provisions puts much pressure on internal domes-
tic legal systems. Only time will reveal how reliable and 
effective the mechanism is.
4. fInAl conclusIons
To sum up, the article concludes that the possibi-
lity of  SSIA is neither a backlash nor a more effective 
strategy compared to ISA. Jurisdiction clauses are ge-
nerally broad enough to encompass all types of  dispu-
tes of  SSIA, including those brought by host States. It 
constitutes an additional opportunity for host States to 
advance their understanding of  the treaties and balan-
ce the investment treaty commitments. In several situa-
tions, SSIA would be the only possible mechanism and 
in others, SSIA will be a complement to ISA. This adds 
important inputs to the interpretation process, enabling 
alternative litigation strategies for host States.
76 Cf. United States reluctance to appoint Chapter 20 panels in 
NAFTA State-State Arbitration.
77 See also Art. 23[12], Brazil-Colombia IIA; and Annex 1 Art. 
7[4], Brazil-Chile IIA.
78 See also Art. 23[1], Brazil-Colombia IIA; and Annex 1 Art. 
2[1], Brazil-Chile IIA.
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These developments have translated into alternative 
settlement mechanisms, into different BIT models or into 
more light-touch approaches. They are not necessarily more 
effective compared to classic ISA, but may be especially fit 
for host States. Anyway, SSIA may serve to remediate some 
of  the shortcomings of  international arbitration and to re-
-engage some States, which have opted out or remained at 
the margins of  the legal development in the area. 
While State-State arbitration may be a viable strategy, 
there are some challenges that need to be overcome. The 
definition of  the term dispute, the obligation to consult 
on the meaning of  provisions and the establishment of  
a clear hierarchy between State-State awards in relation to 
investor-State awards are some of  the ways forward. Each 
of  these aspects should be developed in treaty-making 
initiatives that wish bring new alternatives for host States.
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